Unauthenticated OS command injection enables RCE in mbCONNECT24

2 min readPublished 23 Mar 2026Updated 23 Mar 2026Source: CVEProject (cvelistV5)

CVE-2026-32968 News Remote Code Execution Industrial Systems Web Security

TL;DR — An unauthenticated OS command injection in com_mb24sysapi enables remote code execution on mbCONNECT24/myREX24V2 gateways, turning exposed management surfaces into full device compromise.

What happened

mbCONNECT24 / mymbCONNECT24 (MB connect line) and myREX24V2 / myREX24V2.virtual (Helmholz) are gateway/remote-access products commonly deployed at the edge to connect operational environments to centralized management and tooling.

CVE-2026-32968 describes improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command (OS command injection) in the com_mb24sysapi module that enables unauthenticated remote code execution, with impact characterized as full system compromise. The CVE record also notes this is a variant attack for CVE-2020-10383.

This is a high-priority exposure pattern: pre-auth RCE in edge gateways collapses the trust boundary between IT/OT management planes and field deployments, and “command injection in management modules” continues to be one of the most operationally damaging vulnerability classes to respond to at scale.

Who is impacted

Deployments of MB connect line mbCONNECT24 / mymbCONNECT24 firmware versions <= 2.19.3.
Deployments of Helmholz myREX24V2 / myREX24V2.virtual firmware versions <= 2.19.3.
Highest-risk environments are those where the device management interface (or any service path that can reach the vulnerable module) is reachable from untrusted networks.

Product family	Affected versions (per CERT@VDE/CVE record)	Patched version (per CERT@VDE)
MB connect line `mbCONNECT24` / `mymbCONNECT24`	`<= 2.19.3`	`2.19.4`
Helmholz `myREX24V2` / `myREX24V2.virtual`	`<= 2.19.3`	`2.19.4`

What to do now

Follow vendor remediation guidance from CERT@VDE:

"Update the mbCONNECT24/mymbCONNECT24 instance to version 2.19.4." "Update the myREX24V2/myREX24V2.virtual instance to version 2.19.4."
Inventory where these gateway products are deployed (including lab, staging, and “temporary” remote-access setups) and confirm firmware versions.
Review network exposure: identify which interfaces/ports can reach management functionality and ensure they are not reachable from the public Internet.
If compromise is suspected, treat this as a device-takeover scenario (because the CVE impact is described as full system compromise) and pivot to incident response: validate device integrity, review remote access logs/telemetry available in your environment, and rotate credentials used by/through the gateway where applicable.

Content is AI-assisted and reviewed by our team, but issues may be missed and best practices evolve rapidly, send corrections to [email protected]. Always consult official documentation and validate key implementation decisions before making design or security choices.