Tekton git resolver path traversal exposes resolver pod secrets
TL;DR — Tekton Pipelines’ git resolver has a critical path traversal that can let a tenant read arbitrary files from the resolver pod (including ServiceAccount tokens) by abusing pathInRepo.
What happened
Tekton Pipelines is a Kubernetes-native CI/CD framework for defining and running pipeline tasks as cluster resources.
CVE-2026-33211 describes a critical path traversal in the Tekton Pipelines git resolver via the pathInRepo parameter. A tenant who can create ResolutionRequests (for example through TaskRuns / PipelineRuns that use the git resolver) can read arbitrary files from the resolver pod’s filesystem, and the file contents are returned base64-encoded in resolutionrequest.status.data.
Severity is CVSS v3.1 9.6 (Critical). This is a high-priority CI/CD issue because resolver pods commonly run with access to Kubernetes credentials and build-time secrets; turning “fetch build inputs” into “read arbitrary pod files” is a direct pipeline-to-cluster trust-boundary break.
Who is impacted
- Tekton Pipelines deployments using the git resolver.
- Tenants/users who can influence git resolver inputs via
ResolutionRequests. - Affected versions and patch lines (per the CVE record):
| Tekton Pipelines line | Affected versions (per CVE record) | Patched versions (per CVE record) |
|---|---|---|
1.0.x | >= 1.0.0, < 1.0.1 | 1.0.1 |
1.1.x–1.3.x | >= 1.1.0, < 1.3.3 | 1.3.3 |
1.4.x–1.6.x | >= 1.4.0, < 1.6.1 | 1.6.1 |
1.7.x–1.9.x | >= 1.7.0, < 1.9.2 | 1.9.2 |
1.10.x | >= 1.10.0, < 1.10.2 | 1.10.2 |
What to do now
- Follow upstream remediation guidance and move to a patched release line listed in the CVE record.
"Versions 1.0.1, 1.3.3, 1.6.1, 1.9.2, and 1.10.2 contain a patch."
- Inventory clusters running Tekton Pipelines and determine whether the git resolver is enabled/used by untrusted tenants.
- Reduce exposure by tightening who can create or trigger
TaskRuns,PipelineRuns, andResolutionRequeststhat invoke the git resolver. - If compromise is suspected, treat this as a credential exposure scenario: review usage of resolver-related ServiceAccounts and rotate any credentials/secrets that may be readable by the resolver pod filesystem.
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